Stochastic activity networks for the verification of knowledge bases by Martin L & Romanovsky A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Martin L, Romanovsky A. Stochastic activity networks for the verification of 
knowledge bases. In: International Workshop on Software Engineering for 
Resilient Systems (SERENE 2017). 2017, Geneva, Switzerland: Springer Verlag. 
 
 
Copyright: 
The final publication is available at Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_3  
DOI link to article: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65948-0_3  
Date deposited:   
06/11/2017 
Embargo release date: 
11 August 2018  
Stochastic Activity Networks for Modelling Knowledge 
Bases  
Luke Martin, Alexander Romanovsky 
 
Centre for Software Reliability, Newcastle University 
Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom 
{luke.martin, alexander.romanovsky)@ncl.ac.uk 
Abstract. This paper proposes the application of the stochastic activity 
networks (SANs) formalism for the verification and prototyping of knowledge-
based systems. Typical structural errors of a KBS are redundancy, 
inconsistency, incompleteness and circularity, which affect the general 
reliability of the system. Since the verification is based on SANs and their 
incidence matrix, the rules need to transform rules into a SAN first, then derive 
an incidence matrix from the network. In order to let fuzzy rule-based systems 
detect above the structural errors, we are presenting a SANs-based mechanism. 
This mechanism consists of three phases: rule normalization, rules 
transformation, and rule verification. Rules will be first normalized into Horn 
clauses, then transform the normalized rules into a high-level network, and 
finally we verify these normalized rules. In addition, we are presenting our 
approach to simulate the truth conditions which still hold after a transition firing 
and negation in SANs for rule base modeling. In this paper, we refer to fuzzy 
rules as the rules with certainty factors, the degree of truth is computed in an 
algebraic form based on state equation which can be implemented in matrix 
computation in SANs. Therefore, the fuzzy reasoning problems can be 
transformed as the liner equation problems that can be solved in parallel. We 
use Mobius to realize the mechanism presented fuzzy rules in this paper.   
Keywords: Knowledge Engineering, Reliability, Verification, Formal Methods, 
Stochastic Activity Networks, Mobius  
1   Introduction   
Knowledge-based systems (KBSs) have been widely used in many real-world 
applications and are fast emerging as the latest generation of embedded and real-time 
systems. The purpose of a KBS is to emulate a human expert in making a decision to 
solve a complex domain problem. The core component of a KBS is the knowledge-
base, which is a rule-based system that lists facts, rules, abstract data models and 
interface mechanism as knowledge of a specific domain area. Users of a KBS can 
interact with the system with queries as the same way that they consult with the 
domain experts for obtaining knowledge. In general, the procedures for domain 
experts to accumulate knowledge and expertise is incremental and intuitive, thus, a 
knowledge base needs to be constructed incrementally through an evolutionary 
development process. One of the major issues in building a knowledge base, however, 
is that it is constructed by consulting numerous domain experts, who are likely to 
have conflicting or varying views. Therefore, it is not surprising that many rules in a 
rule base may have structural errors. As addressed in [11], [13], structural errors can 
be classified as: redundant - due to redundant and subsumed rules; inconsistent - due 
to conflict rules; incomplete - due to missing rules; and cyclic - due to infinite 
inference. Each of these clearly have adverse consequences for reliability and a 
method for detecting these errors is required to ensure reliability. Researchers have 
been proposing the use of Petri nets and their extensions to model non-fuzzy rule-
based systems [8], [10], [14]. While there are many advantages to applying the Petri 
net formalism, there are also several advantages to representing rules as stochastic 
activity networks (SANs), due to its capabilities in supporting fizzy conditions before 
a transition can be made. Consequently, once rules have been transformed into SANs, 
the uncertainty reasoning problems can be transformed as the linear equation 
problems, which can be solved in parallel [15] and designers ensures a high quality of 
the system being developed [10]. The mechanism we propose is based on [1] and 
consists of three phases: rule normalization, rules transformation, and rule 
verification. As the scope of this paper is limited to developing a an approach, a high 
level description of the method is given with preliminary results, with future work 
focusing on expanding the approach and deriving a more complete set of results. We 
have implemented a basic SAN model based on this approach using Mobius.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related 
work of rule base verification and fuzzy rule reasoning with high-level Petri nets and 
provides a brief overview of the SANs formalism. Section 3 presents types of 
structural errors in a rule base and the issues of rule base verification and reliability 
estimation. Section 4 addresses our SANs-based approach and the phases of rule 
normalization, rule transformation, and rule verification. We conclude the paper with 
our future research in Section 5.    
2   Related Work 
As addressed in [11], structural errors in a KBS could be classified as redundancy, 
conflict, and incompleteness. Each of these affect the reliability of a KBS and must be 
addressed and repaired. In the case of redundancy, it includes redundancy in pairs of 
rules, subsumed in pairs of rules, redundancy in chains of inference, and subsumed in 
chains of inference. In the case of conflict, it includes conflict with initial facts, 
conflict between the deduced facts, and circularity. In the case of incompleteness, it 
includes unnecessary inputs, dead-ends, unreachable goals, and missing facts. Besides 
various mechanisms of rule base verification, there are many researches targeted to 
using the graphical and mathematical natures of Petri nets (PN) for fuzzy rule 
reasoning. Researchers have been proposing the extension of Petri nets to fuzzy Petri 
nets (FPN) and using FPN to model and reasoning fuzzy rule-based systems. We will 
summarize these mechanisms in this section.  
2.1   Rule Verification  
A Nguyen et al. [13] describes potential problems about a knowledge base and 
introduces their tool, CHECK, detecting errors on the Lockheed Expert System 
(LES). The LES is a rule-based building tool, which represents factual data in its 
frame database and heuristic and control knowledge in its production rule. The LES 
allows knowledge engineers to use both data-driven and goal-driven rules. In the 
knowledge base, consistency and completeness must be insured. There are five steps 
to implement the rule checking. At the first three steps, CHECK finds the relationship 
of clauses and records the information in 2D table of interclause relationship. The 
some problems can be detected by using the table to deduce rule relationships, SAME 
(redundant), CONFLICT, SUBSET (subsumption), SUPERSET (subsumption), 
UNNECESSARY CLAUSE, or DIFFERENT. Then, find the properties of 
unreachable conclusions, dead-end goals, and dead-end IF conditions in the 2D table. 
The 2D table also can generate the dependency chart for detecting the circularity. At 
last, this paper figures out how certainty factors affect the checking. Zhang and In 
[10], it was noted that Nazareth  proposed an approach based on Petri nets to verify a 
rule-based system. His approach adds new arcs backward to all the input places and a 
new input place to ensure every transition will fire at most once and ensure the 
conditions will hold even if the transition has fired. He compares the difference of 
marking before and after firing any sequence of transitions. If a place has no token 
before firing any firing sequence and the place has two tokens after firing two 
individual sequences of transitions, then the system has redundancy or conflict. If a 
place has one token before firing a sequence of transitions and has two tokens after 
firing a sequence of transitions, then the system has circularity. If a place has no token 
before all transitions are fired and still has no token after all transitions are fired, then 
it has a dead end or unreachable goal.  
2.2   Stochastic Activity Networks   
Stochastic activity networks (SANs) are stochastic extensions to Petri nets and to 
the best of the author’s knowledge have not been applied for verifying rules of KBSs. 
SANs have the modelling power of Petri nets and allow a compact representation of 
systems. They consist of: places, activities, input gates and output gates. - Places can 
be seen as a state of the modelled system. Each place of a SAN contains a certain 
number of tokens which represents the marking of the place. Places are represented 
graphically by circles. - Activities represent actions of the modelled system that could 
take some specified amount of time to complete. They are similar to transitions in 
ordinary Petri nets, and are of two types: timed and instantaneous. Timed activities 
have durations that impact the performance of the modelled system such as a packet 
transmission time. This duration can be stochastic. Instantaneous activities represent 
actions that complete or fire immediately when enabled in the system. Activities are 
graphically represented by thick lines for the timed ones, and thin lines for the 
instantaneous ones. Unlike autonomous Petri nets, SANs allow the use of 
uncertainties associated with the completion of an activity. It is called Case 
probabilities, and is represented graphically by small circles on the right side of an 
activity (see Figure 2). Each case stands for a possible outcome, such as a routing 
choice in a network, or a failure mode in a faulty system. So each activity in the SAN 
can have a probability distribution associated with its cases. Moreover, this 
distribution can depend on the marking of the network at the moment of completion 
of an activity. This shows how SAN could be a high level modelling formalism. 
3   Structural Errors in Rule-Based Systems 
In this paper, we are interested in finding structural errors and the set of rules causing 
the structural errors, which affects the reliability of the knowledge base. The reasons 
of structural errors may be due to rule conflicting, missing/mismatched condition, and 
conclusion. As pointed out in [7], [11], [12], [13], we have identified four kinds of 
rules, which may commit structural errors. They are redundancy, inconsistency, 
incompleteness, and circularity rules. Inconsistency rules result in conflict, which is 
the direct source of incorrect rule derivation. Redundancy rules increase the size of 
rule base and cause non-necessary reasoning. Incompleteness rules prohibit rule bases 
from activating certain normal rule derivation. Circularity rules will force the rule 
base to run into an infinite loop of reasoning. Following, we describe those structural 
errors and give example to express. 
 
Inconsistency. Inconsistency results in a conflict of facts and must be resolved for 
correct functioning of a KBS. This means a set of rules are conflicting if contradictory 
conclusions can be derived under a certain condition. An example of inconsistency 
rules is as follows: 
 
R1  : -> P1 
  R2  : P1 -> P2 
R3 : P1 -> P3 
R4 : P2 -> P3 
 
Incompleteness.  Incompleteness occurs when there are missing rules in a rule 
base. Except the rules for representing facts and queries, a rule is called as a useless 
rule if the rule’s condition (conclusion) cannot match other rules’ conclusion 
(condition). The unmatched conditions are called dangling conditions, while the 
unmatched conclusions are called dead-end conclusions. Mostly, the reasons of 
useless rules are due to some missing rules. An example of incompleteness rules is as 
follows: 
 
R1  : -> P1 
  R2  : P1 AND P3 -> P2 
R3 : P1 -> P4 
R4 : P4 -> . 
 
Redundancy. Redundancy occurs when unnecessary rules exist in a rule base. 
Redundancy rules not only increase the size of the rule based but also may cause 
additional useless inferences. Redundancy is classified as being of two kinds: forms-
redundant rule and subsumed. A rule is forms-redundant with respect to a conclusion 
if the conclusion can be reduced from other rules under the same conclusions. A rule 
is subsumed with respect to a conclusion if the conclusion can be reduced from both 
rules and the condition part of the former is included in the condition part of the latter. 
An example of redundancy rules is as follows: 
 
R1  : P1 AND P3 -> P2 
  R2  : P1 AND P3 -> P2 
R3 : P1 -> P2 
R4 : P4 -> P5 
R5 : P4 -> P5 AND P6 
R6 : P2 -> P7 
R7 : P1 -> P7 
 
Circularity. Circularity occurs when several inference rules have circular 
dependency. Circularity rules can cause infinite reasoning and must be broken. If the 
cycle is formed within a rule itself, then we called such circular rule as self-circular 
rule. An example of circularity rules is as follows:  
 
R1  : P1 -> P2 
  R2  : P2 -> P3 
R3 : P3 -> P1 
R4 : P1 AND P4 -> P4 
R5 : P5 -> P5 
4  Stochastic Activity Networks for Knowledge-Based Modelling                             
and Verification 
For effective verification using SANs, it is important that the KBS be formulated in 
manner so as to precisely represent the working of the original rule set. Furthermore, 
within this representation, all errors should be detectable, involving pairs and chains 
of rules. For the present, the verification is limited to systems without uncertainty, 
since it provides for general coverage of errors. The verification strategy also employs 
definitional domain knowledge, so as to improve error detection. This knowledge is 
easily procured and encoded for any domain. The formulation of a KBS as a SAN 
involves the representation of each rule as a transition. Tokens are used to indicate 
validity or establishment of facts. However, some constraints are to be placed on the 
input and output functions for proper transformation. In its most primitive form, each 
rule will have all the antecedents as input places and the consequents as output places 
for the transition in question. It would also require that (4 the in-degree and out-
degree associated with places be set to 1. i.e. 
 
  
 
Thus the rule of the form: 
 
 
 
Would be represented as  
 
 
 
This indicates that the firing of transition tl will add both B and C to the set of 
known clauses. However, in its current state, transition tl cannot be fired as there are 
no tokens in its input places, viz., {A}. However, information concerning the validity 
of A is lost as a result of the firing. This can be rectified by including A in the set of 
output places when tl is fired indicating A, B, and C as known facts. This represents 
an improvement, but is still problematic in that transition tl can be fired again, more 
so, at will, thus increasing the tokens in places A, B, and C ad infinitum. To 
counteract this, each transition will have associated with it, a special place with a 
single token in it. Additionally, the transition can be fired only once, indicating a 
persistent Petri net with no information loss. The use of definitional knowledge in a 
domain does pose some problems. Most KBSs will employ some such knowledge, 
since it is natural information as far as the experts are concerned. This knowledge 
may take the form of data abstraction or mutual exclusiveness. Data abstraction rules 
cover qualitative abstraction, definitional abstraction and generalization [SI. 
Qualitative abstraction involves the transformation of a value on one dimension 
(usually quantitative) to an equivalent value on another dimension, as in “if the 
patient’s temperature exceeds 104OF, then the patient’s temperature is high.” 
Definitional abstraction involves the use of related concepts to describe the same 
property of an object, as in “if the patient’s blood count is low, then that patient is 
anaemic.” Generalizations, on the other hand tend to relate concepts through 
hierarchical structuring, e.g., ‘‘if the patient is male, then the patient cannot be 
pregnant.” Mutually exclusive knowledge relates different classes of a concept, as in 
“if the patient has infection X, then the patient cannot have infection Y ." Knowledge 
of this sort is frequently employed by domain experts when reasoning, but may not be 
explicitly incorporated into the system. Any verification strategy that excludes this 
knowledge would be suspect in that it would ignore potential errors, and possibly 
indicate the possibility of error when none is present. Incorporating knowledge about 
abstraction in a verifier is relatively straightforward; the abstracted knowledge can be 
represented as rules and added to the current rule set. Mutually exclusive knowledge 
can be handled more elegantly through the use of a single place denoting 
inconsistency, as opposed to the use of several rules denoting combinations of 
incompatible clauses. Adopting a more formal notation, let the rule set R consist of k 
rules, with T; = R representing individual rules.  
Using graph theory for rule verification has been addressed in [13]. We can use the 
approach of traditional SANs analysis methods for detecting structure errors. The 
dynamic simulated SAN model can used for explaining processes of logic reasoning 
and visualizing the structure for engineers detecting errors, where Mobius can be 
applied for carrying out this analysis. 
5   Conclusion and Future Research  
In the paper, we have briefly presented the preliminaries of normalizing and ordering 
rules of a KBS and explained the reasoning for this. Once the rules have been 
transformed into high-level SANs, the approach should (in theory) be able to answer 
queries over the net structure and compute the degree of truth to answers, however, 
further technical investigation is required for evaluating this. In future work, our focus 
will be to apply the method presented to an example case study of a KBS, where an 
ongoing PhD research project is focused on developing an advisory system for use in 
railway traffic planning. The knowledge base of the advisory system has been 
designed and developed, but not yet fully evaluated, where it is hoped that this 
presented mechanism can evaluate and verify the knowledge base. We also plan to 
integrate the approach into a reliability estimation method that can help in motivating 
and justifying design decisions at each iterative stage of development.  We also aim to 
concentrate on formalizing and automating the transformation between rules and 
SANs with certainty factors. Furthermore, we have addressed types of structural 
errors in a KBS and proposed a SANs formalism for verifying these structural errors. 
By following the four phases as presented in this paper, we can automatically detect 
types and causes of error. We will further integrate the modeling and reasoning 
strength of SANs and fuzzy set theory to extend the usage of our approach to real-
world applications such as multimedia synchronization, telecommunication, reuse, 
and maintenance. We have applied Mobius, which allows the drawing, execution, and 
reasoning of SANs. 
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